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THE SCOPE OF THE RULE AGAINST UNJUST DIS-
CRIMINATION BY PUBLIC SERVANTS.
r. AT COMMON LAw.
There has ,been a most remarkable absence of any scientific
attempt, both upon the part of courts and of writers, to discover
any criteria by the application of which the exact scope of the
rule prohibiting unjust discrimination by public servants at com-
mon law may be determined. Furthermore, there has been no
attempt to determine the fundamental principle upon which the
decisions of many of the common law cases involving public
service duties depend. This may be accounted for by the fact
that in many of thiese opinions the common law obligation to
serve the entire public and the distinct obligation to render such
service without unjust discrimination have been almost inextric-
ably confused, and the precise basis of the decision -has been left
obscured.
It shall be the purpose of this article to discuss the exact
scope of this rule at common law,'and its relation to the doctrine
of the so-called "Exprss Cases" 1, and cognate decisions, in
which the determination of -the extent to which this rule is
involved becomes of practical importance.
The rule prohibiting unjust discrimination is, at the begin-
ning, to be distinguished from the rule requiring public service
'117 U. S. I (1886).
(109)
110 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
companies to render service to all who apply. If A presents
goods to a common carrier for transportation and the carrier
refuses to accept them, there is a clear violation of the carrier's
duty to render service. It may be that the carrier is performing
the service for all others who apply, and for this reason by its
refusal it has treated shippers unequally. On this account, per-
haps, and because unjust discrimination likewise .involved an
inequality of treatment, though of a distinct type, courts have
frequently said that a carrier guilty of such conduct was prac-
ticing "discrimination" or "unjust discrimination". Why two
doctrines basically so distinct and dependent upon such diverse
conditions should have become so confused solely through loose
and careless nomenclature is a puzzling problem. Cases affirm-
ing one rule were cited in applying the other until the distinc-
tion between the doctrines themselves appea'rs to have been lost
sight of by many of the courts. As has been indicated in a
previous article 2 the precise scope of this doctrine at common
law becomes important in the application of the rule both at
common law and under the Interstate Commerce Act.3 The
problem, briefly stated, is.-this: Is there any test, which, when
applied to concrete cases, will enable us to determine whether an
alleged or admitted obligation- upon the part of public servants
comes properly under their duty to, serve the public or under
their obligation to refrain from unjust discrimination. Upon
the decision of this point may depend the adeiquacy and efficiency
of the remedy, the tribunal in which it is enforced, the measure
of damages, and.innumerable other important practical consid-
erations.
Perhaps the first test that suggests itself is the rather obvious
formula which might be expressed thus: Such services as a
public servant is bound to render for A, irrespective of the fact
that like services are afforded to or withheld from other mem-
bers of the- public, are obligations imposed .under the .public
*"The Origin of the Rule Against Unjust Discrimination," 66 UNiv. o
PENNA. LAW R~viEW, z23.
Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. at L, Ch. o4, p. 379; Comp. Stat., Sec.
8563.
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servant's common law "duty to serve"; those obligations owed
to A solely because such services or privileges are accorded to
others similarly situated, arise out of the public servant's obliga-
tion to refrain from unjwt discrimination. This test, it is sub-
mitted, is accurate. But as a working test it possesses the defect
that it is not, in a certain sense, a test at all, but more accurately
a definition, which when applied to concrete cases does not bear
us far.
There is one test which, with two qualifications, appears to
the writer to be perfectly sound. Fixing a point of division at
the moment when services by the public servant to a patron
begins, that is, when the service actually is commenced, any
duty existing prior to that time is embraced within the servant's
"duty to serve". It is only from that time forward that the
field of "unjust discrimination" is opened.
This test does not imply that from the moment the service
commences all further duties and obligations are embraced within
and must be enforced under the servant's duty to refrain from
unjust discrimination. Thus, a carrier's obligation to provide
sufficient and appropriate facilities for transportation, often
classed under a separate heading as the duty to furnish adequate
facilities, is in reality merely an extension of the duty to serve,
affecting the manner of service. This is an obligation arising
after the service has begun under the test suggested above, and
yet is embraced within the "duty to serve" and not within the
"duty to refrain from unjust discrimination".
To put a concrete case, it may be supposed that a telephone
company refuses to install a telephone for A upon request. This
would clearly be a violation of its duty to render service, and the
test above suggested applies since, under it, until a contractual
relation between the servant and the one served is established,
any common law duty in favor of the patron must be embraced
within this classification. But its obligation to allow A a "flat"
rate will depend, in cases where the rates offered are reasonable,
upon the allowance of these "flat" rates to other patrons.' The
'Mr. Bruce Wyman, in his book on "Public Service Corporations," Sec.
x245, suggests that so long as the rates of a water company are substantially
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elementary difference between the two obligations stands out
.clearly. The former is an absolute duty; the latter is relative.
The former is a fairly fixed and determined obligation, varying
only as the increasing complexity of commercial relations
enlarges the duties of service incident to a public occupation; the
extent of the latter duty is variable and arises out of a situation
of inequality created at the volition of the carrier. The former
is an obligation inherent in'the character of the public service;
the latter depends upon proof of certain conduct toward other
patr'ons. The former duty is enforced by a mandatory order
which leaves no discretion; the latter duty requires an alternative
decree,-an option to render the demanded service or concession
impartially or to abandon it entirely.5 The test suggested is
subject to one criticism and to a single possible qualification.
These will be considered in order.
The criticism of the test is that it is not entirely complete.
Even assuming, as the test does, that all obligations arising prior
to the moment service is begun are embraced within the duty
to serve, what of those obligations which exist after the service
has been undertaken? Are additional obligations embraced
equal under either system, a company may allow "flat" rates to some patrons
and require payment according to meter by others. Most of these decisions
are cases wherein the situations of the patrons differently treated were sub-
stantially dissimilar, and where the fact that one patron was a large user,
such as a boarding house, or a wasteful user, was emphasized in justification
of the unequal treatment. See Shaw v. San Diego Water Co.. 5o Pac. 693
(19o7); Robbins v. Bangor R. & Electric Co., ioo Me. 496 (9o6); Shaw
Stocking Co. v. Lowell, i99 Mass. 118 (19o9); State v. Gosnell, x6 Wis.
6o6 (19o7). The decision in Powell v. Duluth, 91 Minn. 53 (1903), seems
questionable. In that case no dissimilarity between the circumstances of
the patrons was alleged. It was found, however, that the rates under the
two systems were substantially equal, and the court upheld a service rule
that one having once elected to receive water under the meter system could
not later demand a "flat' rate. It would seem that under a proper applica-
tion of the common law rule a patron should be allowed to make his elec-
tion at any time, provided only that he make compensation for any ex-
pense incident to the change.
'Great Northern Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340 (1915); Penn-
sylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 351 (1915). But see Louisville &
Nashville R. R. v. U. S., 238 U. S. 1 (1915), wherein an order by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, objected to because not in the alternative, was
upheld.. The Great Northern Railway case, however, unquestionably ex-
presses the weight of authority. See also 64 Uxrv. op PENNA. Lw RE-
VIEW, 301.
SCOPE OF RULE AGAINST UNJUST DISCRIMINATION 113
within the "duty to serve" or within the "duty to refrain from
unjust discrimination"? To illustrate, is the duty to furnish
ice for a shipment of perishable goods once it has been received
a part of the carrier's duty to serve or dependent upon the fact
that such service is rendered for others? In this type of situa-
tions the test does not assist. The existence or non-existence of
such obligations not specifically imposed by statute is usually
determined, step by step, through the medium of separate deci-
sions; " and under the terms of some modern statutes, to deter-
mine the exact basis of. an obligation at common law is for
some purposes academic; but in dealing -with many of the more
recently recognized branches of public service which freqtiently
are not embraced within the terms of such statutes, the precise
scope and nature of these two common law obligations is con-
stantly important.7
As to duties existing ptior to the time when service is
begun, the test must be stated subject to one possible. qualifica-
tion. In the provision of facilities for service, a branch of the
duty to serve, it is the acknowledged rule that a carrier or other
public servant need only prepare to meet the deman~d for accom-
modations which can reasonably be foreseen, and that for failure
to handle properly a sudden and unexpected influx of business
he is not liable." Let it be supposed that because of a grain
harvest of unusual and unprecedented magnitude a railroad
experiences a serious shortage in cars, one that could not reason:-
ably have been aiticipated. May the railroad allot its entire
equipment to those shippers whom it desires to favor,-.or must
the burden created by the shortage be equalized by a pro rata
distribution? It is well settled.that the latter course is the oh.i-
*A typical illustration of this method, and also of the custom of courts
to vary the extent of such obligations according to physical conditions and
the nature of the service, is seen irf Beard v. Illinois Cent. Railway, 79 ]a.
Si8 (i8go) ; Carr v. Schafer, x5 Colo. 48, 24 Pac. 873 (i8go); Ship !'Maori
King" v. Hughes, 2 Q. B. 550 (1895).
'Of such recently recognized public service occupations, news-gathering
agencies and companies supplying ticker service are typical. Shepard v.
Gold & Stock Telegraph Co..38 llun. .i38 (88); Inter-Ocean Publishing Co.
v. Associated Press, 184 111. 438 (190o).
'Joynes v. P. R. R., 235 Pa. 232 (19121.
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gatory one.9  It is the duty arising before the service has begun,
and would come, therefore, under our test, within the obligation
to render the service. Under which obligation is the duty to
apportion properly classed?
A study of the common law tends to indicate that what-
ever obligation to apportion exists arose-through the obligation
to refrain from unjust discrimination. Before this public serv-
ice obligation had become fully established 10 there was a ten-
dency to hold that when a carrier's facilities were exhausted
by an unusual demand he might employ the available facilities in
the service of those whom he chose. Thus we find that it was a
defense to a'carrier in an action for refusal to serve merely to
prove that his coach was full or that his available facilities were
already occupied. 1 Even under the obligation to refrain from
unjust discrimination the right and sometimes the duty to give
preferences to certain kinds of freight is recognized.1 2 But
before the rule against unjust discrimination had become estab-
lished, the right to impartial service when facilities proved inad-
equate was less secure.'8
It would thus appear that the duty to apportion facilities.in
times of shortage arises from the duty to refrain from unjust
discrimination, and not from the duty to render service. There
is one recent case in the Supreme Court of the United -States,
however, which seems to indicate that the common law-obliga-
tion to serve is broad enough to require an impartial apportion-
ment of facilities.14
'B. & 0. R. R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 48 (igo9).
" The relative dates of the origins of these two doctripes are discussed
in the writer's article on "The Origin of the Rule against Unjust Discrimi-
nation." See note 2, supra.
"Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Shower i27 068). The court having held that a
coachman was a common carrier "we were forced to give .evidence of our
coach's being full; our refusal to carry them; and that, without our knowl-
edge at first, the porter put up the box behind the coach, which, when we
perceived, we denied to take the charge of i."
"Thus it was held justifiable on the part of a railroad to give prefer-
ence to relief supplies shipped to Chicago at the time of the great fire.
Michigan Central R. R. v. Burrows, 33 Mich. 6 (1875); and it is generally
held that there is a duty to give preference to perishable freight. Tierney v.
R. R., 76 N. Y. 3os (i8f9).
"' Peet v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 2o Wis. 594 (i866).
"Pennsylvania R. R. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121 (1914).
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The opinion in this case is illuminating as an illustration of
the manner in which courts frequently fail to specify which of
these common law doctrines is involved and discuss the matter
in general terms when the reasoning .would be materially clarified
if this point were definitely decided. The complaint consisted
in the alleged failure to supply a shipper with a sufficient num-
ber of cars. It was urged in behalf of the railroad that this
being an action for unjust discrimination in interstate commerce,
resort must first be had to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and .that in any event such a suit must be brought in an United
States court, and not in the state court. 15 As an instance of the
deliberate confusion of the two doctrines, a portion of the
ppinion is well worth quoting:
"It makes little difference what name is given the cause of
action sued on in the present case; or whether it is treated as a
suit for a breach of the carrier's common law duty to furnish
cars, or an ation for damages for the carrier's unjust discrimina-
tion in allotting cars to the Berwind-White Company, while at
the same time refusing to follow its own rule and furnish them
to the Puritan Company on the basis of mine capacity. - In either
case the liability is the same. For where the carrier performs its
duty to A. and at the sam6 time fails to perform its duty to B,
there has been, in a sense, a discrimination against B. In those
instances neither the cause of action, nor the jurisdiction of the
court, is defeated because the breach of duty is also *called an
unjust discrimination.
"In the present case the pleadings contained no reference to
the Interstate Commerce Act. The damages grew solely out of
the fact that the Puritan Company failed to receive the number
of cars to which it was entitled. The plaintiff's right and meas-
ure of recovery would have been exactly the same if the cars had
been furnished to a manufacturing plant, instead of the Berwind-
White Coal Company. The plaintiff's cause of action and dam-
" At the trial in the state court the plaintiff seems to have ignored his
common law cause of action and a judgment was entered for the plaintiff
for damages as for uniust discrimination. The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, in affirming the judgment, found an offense three-fold in charac-
ter: "(T) the offense against the common law. (2) an offense against the
Pennsylvania Statute of June 3. 1883, making undue and unreasonable
discrimination unlawful. (3) an offense against Sec. 3 of the Federal Statute
regulating interstate commerce." See the opinion. p. 131.
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ages would have been the same if the failure to receive cars had
been due to the fact that the .carriers negligently allowed empty
cars to stand on side tracks; or, if by reason of a negligent mis-
take they had been sent to the wrong point. The motive caus-
ing the short "supply of cars was, therefore, wholly immaterial,
except as corroboration of other evidence showing an actual
shortage of cars, so that, if we ignore the plaintiff's characteriza-
tion of the defendant's conduct, and consider the nature of the
case, alleged in the first court and established by the evidence,
it will appear that the Puritan Company was entitled to recover
because of the fact that the carrier refused to comply with the
common law liability to furnish it with a proper number of cars."
A little further on the court expresses the common law rule
thus: "The law exacts only what is reasonable from such car-
riers, but, at the same time, requires that they should be equally
reasonable in the treatment of their patrons. In case of car
shortage occasioned by -unexpected demands, they are bound to
treat shippers fairly, if not, identically."
The case of an excusable inadequacy of facilities where ihe
obligation to apportion exists is the only situation which has
occurred to the writer where the test above suggested for deter-
mining the scope of the duty to serve may perhaps not prove
accurate in application. It is a .duty arising before service has
been begun. Viewing the subject broadly,- in the light of the
decisions in which the duty to apportion has been recognized,
it would appear that it has been founded upon the obligation to
refrain from unjust discrimination. ' But in this recent Supreme
Court case there is a suggestion that the "duty to serve" may
have a broader significance in cases of inadequacy of facilities;
namely, a duty to serve impartially where complete service is
impossible. The above test, however, .subject to this possible
qualification in cases involving apportionment, constitutes, it is
submitted, a criterion by which the character of a public service
obligation, arising prior to the commencement of service, may be
determined.
The confusion in the decisions involving the common law
obligations to serve and to refrain from unjust discrimination has
persisted to the present day. Of this a single case recently de-
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cided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts may be taken as
strikingly illustrative, and a careful analysis of the decision may
not be inappropriate.' The facts, briefly stated, are these: A
telegraph company purchased stock quotations from a stock ex-
change, and distributed them among stock brokers through the
medium of a ticker service operated over its lines. Under its
contract the telegraph company was to supply quotations only
to brokers approved by the stock exchange. The stock exchange
arbitrarily withheld its approval of a certain broker, who ap-
pealed to the Public Service Commission and secured an order
compelling the company to supply them.
There are two grounds upon which the service might have.
been compelled under public service law.17  It might have been
held that the furnishing of stock quotations by telegraph com-
panies is a service incidental to the telegraph business; a collat-
eral and related service so germane to that business that to accord
it to one and refuse it to another similarly situated would amount
to unjust discrimination in the conduct of that occupation. It
might, on the other hand, have been held that the business of
supplying -ticker service, of itself, was so affected with a -public
interest that the obligations of public sdrvice should attach to it,
under which -theory the obligation to supply'the quotations
would have ex.isted under the "duty to serve". The court took
neither of these posifions, but an intermediate and, it would
seem, illogical one.
18
"Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Fobter. 224 Mass. 365 (1916).
"The Massachusetts statute prohibited "the extension of any rule, reg-
ulation. privilege or facility, except such as are specified in said sched-
ule and regularly and uniformly extended to all persons and corporations
under like circumstances for the like, or substantially similar, scrvices."
Mass. St. 1913. Ch. 784. Sec. 2o.
"The mere fact that a public servant may entirely abandon a branch
of service does not prove that his obligation to render service to all, while
he professes to supply it. arises from his duty to refrain from unjust dis-
crimination. and not from his duty to render service. Commonwealth v.
Fitchburg Railroad Co.. 12 Gray i8o (Mass. x8sS). But the fact that a
decree is in the alternative, requiring uniform treatment or a total aban-
donment of the service, ofte, indicates -hat the basis of the decree is un-
just discrimination. See Great Northern R. R. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 34o
(J9I,); Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. People, 56 Ill. 365 (187o); Anacostia Citi-
zens! Association v. B. & 0. Railroad Co., 25 . C. C. 411 (1912).
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It first states that the commission's order was designed to
prevent "unfair and unjust discrimination by the telegraph com-
panies". Then comes language indicating that the court con-
sidered the service so intimately related to the telegraph business
as to be embraced within the rule against unjust discrimina-
tion; " which is followed by the statement, with authorities, that
"telegraph companies exercise a public employment and are
bound to serve all the public without discrimination." Up to
this point the basis of the decision seems to be the rule against
"unjust discrimination.
But here the former ground appears to have been abandoned,
and the theory adopted that the bu'siness of supplying ticker
service is so affected with a public interest that the duty to serve
all who apply is incident to it.2 0 Next the court cites cases of
which State v. Bell Telephone Co.21 is typical, wherein the right
of a telephone company to refuse service to a member of the
public because, under contract with the patentee- of. the telephone,
it had agreed not to serve any patron not approved by the pat-
entee, was denied. In such cases the refusal is very clearly and
obviotisly a violation of the compahy's duty to serve, and the
doctrine of discrimination is not involved. And finally, the
court upholds the jurisdiction of the commission expressly on
the ground that the business consists in "the transmission of
'The court says, on p. 371: "The property acquired by the telegraph
companies in the stock quotations has no value to them except as they use
their public franchises, granted and exercised solely because, of the public
service they are organized to render, in sending these quotations to finan-
cial centres for distribution by sale to their patrons. They are able to se-
cure patrons in the case at bar solely through the exercise of their public
functions in and under the streets of Boston. Such property, destined to
such use as are the quotations, is as subject to public regulation in its use
as are its other public functions. The property right is merely incidental
to the public service function.'
'Quoting from p. 372: "When such corporatlons have acquired rights
in the disposal of which the public are interested, they must deal with those
rights in- accordance with the requirements of public regulations. The
rights which these telegraph companies have acquired in connection with
the quotations are beyond those merely incident to the transmission of in-
telligence from one person to another. They involve the distribution and
dissemination of information as to which it has assumed far greater duties
than those of simple transmission, and as to which its facilities growing out
of its public character must be used."
"23 Fed. S39 (1885).
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intelligence within the Commonwealth by electricity", 22 a calling
that is made a public service occupation by statute; and, as such,
the duty to supply quotations would very clearly come tnder the
duty to render service.The foregoing case has been selected for detailed analysis
because it is typical of dozens of others wherein the exact ground
of the decision is equally obscure. It is true that in this particu-
lar case the same result would have been arrived at under either
theory, and it may, perhaps, be urged that to insist upon such
a distinction is hypercritical. But it is submitted that two
doctrines, so fundamentally different, should so far as possible
be kept separate; and had this attitude been adopted in the early
cases it would unquestionably have contributed greatly to the
certainty and clarity of the common law affecting public
servants.
2. THE RELATION OF THE RULE OF THE EXPRESS CASES AND
COGNATE DECISIONS TO THE RULE PROHIBITING UNJUST
DISCRIMINATION.
The facts of the celebrated Express Cases23 are now so
familiar that a repetition of them here is not essential. The
problem they presented was the right of a railroad company to
make an exclusive contract with a single express company to
operate upon its lines, and to exclude therefrom all other express
carriers. The right to do so was affirmed.
Prior to the decision in this case, the identical problem had
come before the highest court of three of the states, and a dia-
metrically opposite conclusion had uniformly been reached.2 '
" Mass. St. i913, Ch. 784, Sec. 2, gives the commission the power to
regulate certain services, when furnished for public use, intehr aWta. "the
transmission of intelligence within the commonwealth by electricity, by means
of telephone lines or telegraph lines or any other method or system of com-
munication, including the operation of all conveniences, appliances, instru-
mentalities, or equipment utilized in connection therewith or appertaining
thereto."
V 17 U. S.1 (886).
"Sandford v. Railroad Co., 24 Pa. 378 (1855); New England Express
Co. v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 57 Me. 188 (1869); McDuffee v. R. R.,
N. H. 430 (813),
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,The same problem has arisen in cognate cases involving the
right of a:railroad company to give exclusive privileges to hack-
men, b.ggage and transfer companies, and draymen, enabling
them to enter the stations of the railroads or to come upon their
premises for the purpose of soliciting patronage from incoming
passengers. The right of an innkeeper to grant exclusively to
one liveryman the right to come upon his premises to solicit bag-
gage among his guests has been subject to litigation ; 25 and when-
ever a public servant attempts to delegate an exclusive privilege
in a matter relating to a duty, either active or passive, which
it owes to the public, the same problem is presented.
Upon the whole subject there has always existed a conflict
among the authorities, with the weight inclining more and more
toward the federal view. With the respective merits of the
diverse views upon this question the present article is not pri-
marily concer-ned. They are discussed exhaustively in a learned
article by Mr. Bruce Vyman."'1. But at the beginning it is nec-
essary to state two propositiois, which are hereinafter to be de-
veloped. The first is that whatever duty exists on the part of
public servants to permit free -competition among such conces-
sionaries and to refrain from exclusive arrangements, where such
a duty is recognized, is a duty incident to its obligation to the
general public and not to the intermediate concessionaries, as
such; .2' the second, that whatever obligation exists in suclh situa-
tion is one arising before service is commenced, and, unider the
test laid down in the preceding discussion, falls properly under
'Markham v.'Brown, 8 N. H. 523 (1837).
""The Public Duty of the Common Carrier in Relation to Dependent-
Services." The Green Bag. Vol. 7. p. s7o (19o5). The substance of this
article is embodied in Wyman. "Public Service Corporations," Vol. i,, Sec.
470 et seq., where he discusses the advantages and disadvantages of what
he terms the "conservative" and "progressive" or "radical" views.
' It is seldom that one finds the problem perceived as clearly as in
Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 377 (i9o3) at p. 394. The court there says:
"The right of a hackman or a job-teamster to enter a railroad station in
the prosecution of his business, when it exists, is derived from, or is in-
cluded in, the passenger's right as against the railroad to reasonable means
of transportation for himself and baggage, and is not a right derived from
any duty which the corporation owes him directly as a connecting carrier."
Starting with a clear conception of the problem involved the court dis-
cussed the proposition from this viewpoint.
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the servant's duty to serve, rather than under its obligation to
refrain from unjust discrimination.
The precise relation that this body of cases bears to the
common law rule prohibiting unjust discrimination by public
servants has both an historical and a present practical interest.
In Messenger v. Pennsylvania Railroad,28 frequently considered
as first having laid down the rule ,against unjust discrimination
in America 29 the three early "express" cases already cited 30
were referred to as the sole authority for the rule there an-
nounced. 31 Furthermore, if the Pennsylvania case could prop-
erly be said to have been decided under the rule against unjust
discrimination, it constitutes the earliest American case reciting
that doctrine.:' Cases of this type have been cited repeatedly
in opinions expressing the common law rule against unjust dis-
crimination. While in problems relating to the obligations of
railroads toward express companies, in the broad field of inter-
state commerce, the rule of the Express Cases controls, 3 and it
is only in the relatively unimportant field of intrastate" commerce
that the local rules are still important; yet the same problem in
the case of hackmen, baggage-men and draymen, and those en-
gaged in kindred services, is still a live one, open in many juris-
dictions, and, under decisions conflicting in principle, mooted in
others.
It is submitted that the services to patrons that are usually
delegated by public servants under exclusive agreements are
divisible into three classes. Speaking in terms of its duty to the
public and not to an intermediate concessionaire, one might put,
in the first class, those services as to which the public servant
owes an active duty. Thus it is generally believed, notwithstand-
'8 Vroom (N. J.) 531 (1874).
'Writer's article on "The Origin of the Rule Against Unjust Discrimi-
nation." 66 UNIv. OF PA. LAW REVIEW 123.
"Supra, note 24.
'4The case Audenried v. P. & R. R. R., 68 Pa. 370 (187j), was also cited,
but it was not apropos, and only by a loose dictum supported the decision.
" Supra, note 29.
" Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 49o (1912).
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ing a dictum in an early case to the contrary,34 that an obligation
upon the part of railroads to provide for the expeditious trans-
portation of small parcels exists, and that if no express company
volunteered to perform the service the railroad itself would be
compelled to undertake it. That there are no decisions but
merely dicta to this effect is accounted for by the fact that since
the demand for express service became general, companies
anxious to supply it have not been wanting. It may therefore
be considered an active obligation on the part of the servant.
In the second class are those services as to which is owed
a passive obligation. It is the right of a member of the public
arriving at a railroad station to be enabled, either at the station
or in its immediate vicinity, to contract with hackmen for his
transportation from the station and with transfer companies for
the conveyance of his baggage.35 But the duty of the railroad
is merely passive and it need take no steps to further such facili-
ties. Whether it must under its duty to the public permit the
use of the station by all hackmen or others for soliciting trade,
or whether it may admit one exclusively is a point upon which
the cases split; but the duty is in this case not an active one, but
merely one of laissez-faire or non-interference.
The third class embraces those services usually supplied
under exclusive contracts as to which the servant owes no duty,
either active or passive. These include the right to sell confec-
tionery, newspapers, and magazines upon railroad property and
the law is very clear and free from conflict that in such matters
exclusive contracts are permissible.36 This latter class of serv-
UIn Dinsmore v. L C. & L. Ry., 2 Fed. 465 (x880), the earliest fed-
eral case upon the question of the obligation to accommodate express com-
panies, the right of a railroad itself- to carry express to the exclusion of
express companies was denied, the court saying (p. 472): "It is enough to
say that railroads were not created to do an express business, and possess no
legal rights to engage in it, cannot be required to undertake and perform
it, and, I maY add, ought not to be permitted to engage in those branches
of the express business ultra vires their corporate powers." See also:
Southern Express Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 4 Fed. 481 (i88o); and
Southern Express Co. v. Memphis & L. R. R., 8 Fed. 799 (x88i).
'Old Colony Railroad v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35 (1888); Griswold v.
Webb, 16 R. 1. 649 (r889); Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 377 (1903).
"Old Colony Railroad v. Tripp, supra, note 35.
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ice obviously can bear no relation to the law prohibiting unjust
discrimination nor the duty to serve, and may be dismissed with-
out further comment. Aside from an occasional tendency on the
part of the courts to reason by analogy that because exclusive ar-
rangements may be made in such cases, they are also permissible
in the type of cases symbolized by the "hack" cases, the rule has
remained clear. It may be that in both types of cases exclusive-
arrangements should be permitted. But in the one case, at least,
a duty, passive though it be, to permit the rendition of the serv-
ice, exists; in the other, the service may be entirely eliminated.
37
Among the cases involving the rights of express companies,
the Express Cases, which rank first in importance, are free from
any suggestion of the rule against unjust discrimination. It was
emphasized that such companies had in the past always been
carried under special contracts, and the fact that they had not
held themselves out as "'common carriers of express compan-
ies" 38 was alluded to, but the court seems to have perceived
clearly that whatever duty existed was owed directly to the
public, as it says: "I "So long as the public are served to their
reasonable satisfaction, it is a matter of no importance who
serves them. The railroad company performs its whole duty to
the public at large and to each individual when it affords the
public all reasonable express accommodations." '40 It cannot,
however, be said that the opinion in this case gives due advert-
ence to the argtments opposed to its conclusion and the possible
"See ibid, p. 39.
"At p. 21.
At p. 24.
Certain English cases are sometimes erroneously referred to as op-
posed to the rule of the Express Cases. In these cases it was held that a
carrier who collected small parcels from individual shippers and shipped
them in a single "packed" parcel was entitled to the same rates charged in-
dividual shippers for large parcels, and need not pay the rate on each parcel
separately. See Pickford v. Grand Junction Ry., io M. & W. 399 (1842);
Great Western Railway v. Sutton (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 226. In the United
States, under the Interstate Commerce Act, it was likewise held that a car-
rier had no'right "to make the ownership of goods the criterion by which his
charge for carriage is to be measured," and that a forwarder who collected
goods fiom others for shipment was entitled to a reduced carload rate
equally with individual shippers. Interstate Commerce Commission v. DeL,
L & W. R. R., 22o U. S. 235 (91o).
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right of the public to demand a situation free from the extorsive
tendencies of monopolistic privilege. The earlier "express"
cases already referred to which had reached the opposite conclu-
sion were neither cited nor commented upon; 41 and a long line
of cases in the lower federal courts, some of them carefully re-
soned, were not mentioned.
42
In the three early "express" cases in the state courts, the
idea' of a duty of public servants to serve carriers acting in
the capacity of concessionaires and the duty to refrain from
unjust discrimination among carriers is confused. In Sandford
v. Railroad, 4 3 the earliest of these, the conception that the public
may be entitled to the benefits of free competition among con-
cessionaires seems to shine through. Chief 'Justice Lewis at one
point says: "The power to regulate the transportation on the
road does not carry with it the right to exclude any particular
individuals, or to grant exclusive privileges to others. Compe-
tition is the best protection to the public, and it is against the
policy of the law to destroy it by creating a monopoly of any
branch of business." But the court concludes its opinion in the
following words: "like the customers of a grist-mill they have
a right to be served, all other things equal, in the order of their
applications. A regulation, to be valid, must operate on all alike.
If it deprives any persons of the benefits of the road, -or grants
exclusive privileges to others, it is against'law and void." These
final sentences summarize the basis of the decision.and are admit-
tedly ambiguous. While the possible right of the public to free-
dom from monopoly was suggested, the final conclusion appears
to have been worked out in terms of the railroad's obligation
to the carriers themselves. The analogy of the miller referred
to connotes an obligation to accommodate all express carriers
aSupra, note24.
'Dinsmore v. Louisville. etc., R. R., 2 Fed. 465 (iS8o); Southern Ex-
press Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. R., 4 Fed. 481 (i88o); Texas Ex. Co. v. Tex.
& R. R. R., 6 Fed. 426 (x88); So. Ex. Co. v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co., 8
Fed. 799 (t88i); Wells etc., v. Oregon, etc., R. R., i8 Fed. 667 (1883);
Wells, etc.. v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 19 Fed. 2o (1884); Wells, etc., v.
North. P. R. R.. 23 Fed. 469 (1884). See 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783.
a 24 Pa. 378 08ss).
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who apply as part of its duty to serve such carriers; the follow-
ing portion suggests that the duty may arise solely because such
service is accorded other carriers, under the obligation to refrain
from unjust discrimination.
In New England Express Co. v. Maine Central Railroad 
44
the principle applied by the court in arriving at the same decision
is less obscure. While the language at times confuses the actual
theory adopted by the court, it appears to be included in these
words: "The very definition of a common carrier excludes the
idea of the right to grant monopolies or to give special and
unequal preferences. It implies indifference as to whom they
.may serve, and an equal readiness to serve all who may apply,
and in the order of their application. ' 45  Here againi'no possi-
bility of the right of the public who are patrons of express car-
riers to insist upon free competition among them is hinted at.
Neither is the rule against unjust discrimination relied upon.
The obligation is created upon the theory that -there is a duty
on the part of the railroad to render service to carriers, as such,
just as the duty existed to serve individual members of the
public in other situations.
Chief Justice Doe in McDuffee v. Railroad,48 the last and
most exhaustively considered of the early "express" cases, dis-
cusses thoroughly the various obligations of common carriers.
4
The precise ground of the decision, is stated more clearly and
unequivocally than in either of the former decisions. "A rail-
road corporation" it was held, "carryirg one expressman, and
enabling him to do all the business on the line of their road,
do hold themselves out as common carriers of expresses; 48 and
4"6s7 Me. MS (1869).
'*Ibid. p. x96.
4952 N. H. 43o
'The opinion presents a striking example of the loose use of the term
"discrimination" when a dereliction in the duty to serve is intended, and a
general confusion of the two ideas. The term "unequal preference" and
"unreasonable discrimination" are used (at pp. 448, 9) to describe a violation
of the carrier's duty to serve; and also of the right to equality, as free-
dom from "unreasonable and injurious discrimination in respect to terms,
facilities or accommodations."
" Italics are the writer's.
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when they unreasonably refuse, directly or indirectly, to carry
more public servants of that class, they perform this duty with
illegal partiality." It assumes that when a railroad once admits
a single express company it undertakes as a part of its public
profession the carriage of all express companies desiring it; a
conclusion against which the fact that express privileges are
granted undei" special contracts strongly militates. In the
Express Cases the precise question was framed and the opposite
conclusion reached. 4" The McDuffee Case recognizes a duty to
serve express companies and upon this bases its decision.50
The cases wherein the problem in regard to express facili-
ties has arisen are few, and these decisions being among the
earliest merit careful analysis as to their basis. The clearly
logical view of more recent acceptation is that any duty which a
railroad owes is to the general public, and not to any specific
class of the public such as express carriers, which are in turn
engaged in public service. Whether their duty to the public, the
ultimate shippers, requires that they permit free competition
among expressmen, or whether their duty to the general public
is performed when they have supplied the "reasonable express
accommodations" of the Express Cases under an exclusive and
monopolistic arrangement, there is room for a difference of
opinion; and a split exists. A doctrine that they clearly do not
involve is the rule against unjust discrimination. But the earliest
of these cases "' relied upon that doctrine in reaching its decision.
The latter two 12 were grounded upon the carrier's "duty to
serve," but upon an erroneous application of the doctrine in
conceiving a duty to serve express carriers, as such, where the
"117 U. S. 1 (1886), at p. 26.
"In Sargent v. Boston & Lowell R. R., xi5 Mass. 416 (1874), decided
a year later, the same problem was presented. The question here, how-
ever, wa whether a railroad could exclude all express companies from
its lines and conduct that business on its own account. The problem of
unjust discrimination therefore could not arise and the question of a. duty
to serve was flatly presented. The court decided that no such duty ex-
isted. The rule was later altered in Massachusetts by statute. Kidder v.
Fitchburg R. R., i6s Mass. 398 (1896).
' Supra. note 43.
Supra, notes 44 and 46.
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only duty that exists is toward the public at large. The failure
to .perceive the difference between a duty to the public through
their relations with independent carriers, and their duty qua
these carriers themselves, has caused much confusion; a difficulty
born, perhaps, of the fact that, irrespective of the one to whom
the duty was properly owed, as a common law proposition, be-
fore the advent of the modern commission, it was almost invar-
iably the concessionaire who sought to enforce it, whether in his
own right or in behalf of an aggrieved public4
The same problem is arising constantly in modern times in
a multitude of situations wherein the right of a public servant to
grant an exclusive contract with a concessionaire rendering a
related service is questioned. Among these are baggage, hack,
and draying privileges at railroad stations, stock yards, grain
elevators, ticker service and other similar -vocations." There
should be no difficulty in applying the rule in these cases. A
jurisdiction which approved the rule of the Express Caser would
naturally be expected to permit exclusive contracts for supply-
ing hack service; while a jurisdiction which adopted the attitude
of the McDuffee Case in the instance of express companiesi
would be expected to compel free competition among hackmen,
baggagemen and draymen. This result, however, has frequently
failed to follow.
S This hypothesis does not appear to have been commented upon in
this country, but some of the early English cases throw an interesting
light upon it. In Barker v. Midland Ry, x8 C. B. 46 (1856), a case wherein
the right of an omnibus driver to come upon the ground of a railroad
station was at issue, Crowder, J., said: "This is not an action brought
by a person wishihg to travel by the defendants' railway or to send
goods by it; but by a person who carries to and from the railway persons
who are desirous of using or who have used the railway. He is clearly
not a person who can complain of an obstruction." 'And in Ex parte
Painter, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 702 (1857) where it was alleged that the service sup-
plied under existing exclusive contracts was not entirely sufficient, Creswell.
J., said: "I am of opinion that no ground is presented to justify the in-
terference of the court. Before we put the powers of the act in motion,
we must be satisfied that, there is some substantial injury or inconven-
ience to the public, and that the complaint is bona fide made on behalf
of the public"; to which Williams, J., added: "The complaint must come
from those who use the railway."
" For a discussion of the law concerning these services with authori-
ties, see Wyman, "Public Service Corporations," Vol. x, Sec. 481, es seq.
128 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
It is entirely understandable that the two situations might
well be distinguished for practical reasons. Theoretically, if
free competition is demandable in one, it is equally demandable
in the other. In each of these situations the public servant owes
a duty, active or passive. It may be, as the Express Cases hold,
that this duty is satisfied by a monopolistic delegation of the
privilege; or it may be that it requires free competition. But,
since the same duty exists in each case, the situations are analo-
gous, and in theory the decision should be the same. It is
entirely possible that for practical considerations the rule appli-
cable to express companies might not, for example, be properly
suited to the case of hack service. It may be that in practice
efficient service demands monopoly in the one case and free com-
petition in the other. And, if the courts, acknowledging frankly
the similarity of the duty and the theoretical analogy in the two
situaticms, had decided that for practical reasons a different rule
should be applied to this or that occupation, their attitude would
have been entirely consistent. Instead, a different result has
frequently been reached in the same jurisdiction either by deny-
ing the analogy and applicability of the theory, or by entirely
ignoring the case announcing the cohtrary doctrine. A result
that might plainly have been justified upon frank practical rea-
sons is rendered illogical by an attempt to distinguish the cases
on theory.
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently
followed the principle of the Express Cases and permitted exclu-
sive contracts in the case of hacks.55 There, as in the Express
Cases, the argument of convenience,. a practical consideration,
was emphasized. It was pointed out that in a station of the
size of the Union Passenger Station of Chicago, the inevitable
congestion due to the frequency of arriving and departing trains,
and the number of people accommodated, made it highly, import-
ant that the confusion incident to the solicitation of passengers
by competing hackmen be avoided. The preponderance of
authority in most of these incidental services inclines toward
" Donovan v. Pennsylvania Company, igg U. S. M7 (r9o5).
SCOPE OF RULE AGAINST UNJUST DISCRIMINATION 129
the federal rule, and because of the respect accorded decisions of
tle Supreme Court of the United States, the adoption of this
rule is becoming more and more general. 6
The minority view represents a position that is far from
indefensible, and one in favor of which a great deal may be
said. It is perhaps best set forth in Montana Union Railway v.
Langlois,57 an opinion that is noteworthy because the existence
of a duty to the public, so frequently lost sight of, is clearly rec-
ognized. Mr. Justice Harwood there says that "the public is
entitled to whatever competition may grow out of the public
demands, on the one hand, and the contest of others to supply
such demands; and receive compensation therefor."' "
A study of the position of the English courts reveals at an
early date a curious reversal of attitude. In Parker v. Midland
Railway Company 9 it was held that no .action could be main-
tained by an omnibtis proprietor for a refusal to admit him to
a station yard. Half a year later .a case arose in which a
railroad had granted the proprietor of a certain omnibus the
exclusive privilege of entering their grounds to receive or dis-
charge passengers. The court held that in the absence of proof
that public convenience required this exclusive arrangement, the
"balance of convenience" was against the public, and that equal
accommodations must be given." An exclusive arrangement is
"Old Colony R. R. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35 (1888)- Kates v. Atlanta
Baggage Co., 107 Ga. 636 (x899).
9 Mont. 419 (189o).
'Kalamazoo Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich. 194 (i89o).
Mr. Wyman, arguing against the view of the Donovan case, ays:
"The right of the passengers to have ingress to the station by any car-
riage that he chooses to .mploy nobody dares to deny; it is very hard to
see any essential difference from the obligation to give egress without dis-
crimination." Wyman, Public Service Corporations, Vol. i, See. 486. But
the right of a hack ordered in advance by telephone or otherwise, by an
arriving passenger, to enter the station grounds to secure its fare, is
equally established, even in jurisdictions where exclusive contracts are
permitted, and it is submitted that this is the true analogy. That a right.
should exist to enter the premises to solicit among arriving passengers
does not necessarily follow.
"i8 C. B. 46 08S6).
"In re Marriott, T C. B. (N. S.1 499 (1857). While the language of
the opinion is concerned chiefly with the right to enter the grounds with
passengers, the rule, which was made absolute, required access for "for-
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regarded as an undue and unreasonable preference which must
bring some compensating advantage to the public to justify its
existence. But a few months later the opposite result was
reached by stating the rule conversely. A similar arrangementi
because not shown to be detrimental to the public, was upheld; 01
and the same rule was reiterated a few days later, namely, that
public inconvenience must be shown to avoid an exclusive
arrangement, a position contrary to the earlier view that an
exclusive agreement constitutes a preference which is prima facie
bad, and requires a compensating public advantage to jus-
tify it.
0 2
It has been pointed out that logically there is no distinction
in theory between the express cases and the hack and other
cognate cases, and that if in any jurisdiction for practical rea-
sons a different result is desired in the one service than in the
other, such a departure should be justified wholly upon practical
considerations.
In New Hampshire, the jurisdiction -which in the McDuffee
Case (' required equal facilities for all express companies, an
earlier case had carried the same doctrine to an unusual extent.
There has been a tendency to relieve the modem innkeeper from
many of his burdens as a public servant, and no modem regula-
tion of rates for inns having been attempted, it seems doubtful
whether the modern innkeeperwould still be considered a public
servant even to the extent of obliging him to receive travelers,
were it not that such a liability has traditionally and historically,
from very early times, attached to -that profession. The court
held, however, that an innkeeper could not admit the driver of
one stage-coach line upon his premises for the purpose of solicit-
ing patronage among his guests and -deny the right to another.6 4
As an extension of the public service obligation to innkeepers
warding, -receiving and delivering traffic-to the same extent as other pub-
lic vehicles of similar description."
'In re Beadell. 2 C. B. tN. S.) 509 (1837).
" Ex parte Painter. 2 C. B. (N. S.) 702 (I857).
a Supra. note 24.
oMarkham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523 (1837).
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this case is probably extreme; yet together with the McDuffee
Case, it shows the attitude of the New Hampshire court in pre-
venting monopolistic arrangements by public servants with per-
sons performing related services.
In view of this authority, the baggage problem, when it
arose in the same state, was hardly treated as one might have
expected. In Hcdding v. Gallagher the court held that a rail-
road might exclude all baggage carriers except one from its
station." Here again a distinction might have been made for
practical reasons such as convenience, but instead there is an
attempt to distinguish the cases on theory and to establish an
abstract right, apart from practical considerations, to exclude
all carriers save one. In distinguishing Aarkhtam v. Broun
the court compares the situation in that case to the right of a
guest at a hotel to receive a business caller. The falsity of the
analogy is patent. Both the coach driver seeking patronage at
the hotel and the baggageman at the depot are public servants
and not private business guests. It may be that arbitrary exclu-
sion should be permitted in both cases or in neither; but in
theory it is vain to attempt to distinguish them.60
The court's attempt to distinguish the case on principle from
the New Hampshire and Maine express cases is no more logical.
That the express companies seek contractual relations with the
railroad cannot be material. The duty on the part of the rail-
road in this case is an active affirmative one for which they are
entitled to compensation: the duty in the baggage case is a pas-
sive one and the mere payment of compensation according to
a contract or schedule under the first .case does not alter the
principle. The essential fallacy of the argument, it is submitted,
is revealed in this conclusion: "It is sufficient for present pur-
" Hedding v. Gallagher. 72 N. 11. 3,-7 (go3).
" The court says, on p. 389: "The right of a guest to receive callers,
while being entertained in a hotel, is quite different from the right of a
passenger, whcn alighting from a train, to be importuned by a crowd of un-
necessary job-teamsters." This loses sight of the fact that the particu-
lar "caller" concerned was a public servant, and that the -exclusion was
in each case attempted by a party owing public service duties; and non
consfa, that the presence of more than one stage-driver was quite as
.unnecessary" as the presence of a Plurality of basgaiemen.
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poses that these cases (express cases) do not sustain the prop-
osition, that if the railroad allows one man to do a privatc"
business in its station it must not exclude others who desire
the same privilege." This entirely loses sight of the fact that
the business of the baggage-man is a public and not a private
occupation. 68
The fact that the public servant receives compensation for
the grant of the exclusive privilege is not material and should
occasion no difficulty. The situation is not analogous to that
where a demand is made upon a public servant for the use of its
facilities by a rival engaged in the same business, who demands
the use of the first servant's facilities in order to compete with
him. In the present type of cases the servant is receiving com-
pensation for an exclusive privilege granted in a distinct form
of public service, collateral to and not competitive with the serv-
ice which it renders. In Jenks v. Coleman,5 Mr. Justice Story
decided that a steamboat company which had a pecuniarily val-
uable contract with a stagecoach line might exclude from its
boat an agent who solicited passengers for a rival stage line.
Cases of this type are clearly sustainable under the principle that
a carrier's obligation only extends to the carriage of bona fide
passengers or travelers, and that he is not bound to permit
solicitation in the business of baggage transportation, or any
other business, whether he is or is -not pecuniarily interested
therein, by passengers on his train or other conveyance.70 In
State v. Stecle 71 a decision diametrically opposed to that of
Markham v. Brown was reached, and the right of 'an innkeeper
- At p. 391; italics are the writer's.
'One possible ground for distinguishing the express case is suggested;
namely, that "the railroad's public duty of equal treatment relates only to per-
sons or corporations, having business, relations with it in the matter of
railroad transportation." It is true that the express cases involve railroad
transportation, and that the baggage and back cases do not. But it is dif-
ficult to conceive of this distinction as other than arbitrary; and even
conceding it, it fails to explain the Markham case.
"2 Sumner 221 (U. S. C. C. 1835).
'See, "The D. R. Martin," TI Blatch. 233 (1873); Barney v. Oyster
-Bay, etc., Steamboat Co., 67 N. Y. 301 (i8;6); Story, Bailments, 9th Ed.,
Secs. 591, 59za; Angell, Carriers, Sec. "A
" 56 N. C. 766 089o).
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to prohibit the solicitation of business on his premises by all
livery-stable proprietors save one, who paid for the exclusive
privilege, was affirmed. The court distinguished the Markham
Case on the ground that there it did not appear that any pecuniary
loss to the innkeeper was involved, while in this case such an
injury necessarily resulted.
72
In Kalama.zoo Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsma 73 the Supreme
Court of Michigan held that free competition among hackmen
could be demanded. In a later case in the same jurisdiction the
opposite conclusion was reached, and a novel view taken of the
effect of the receipt of compensation by the railroad for the
privilege. 4 A carrier engaged in the transfer of baggage com-
plained that a rival was given free passes and that his agents
were permitted to ride on the trains to solicit baggage from
passengers, while this privilege was denied, the complainant.
After stating that the weight of authority was opposed to the
Kalatmzoo Hack Case, the court says that.the present case is
not within its principle, for in the former case it appeared that
the contract between the railroad company and its lessee was one
which resulted in profit to the company, while in the case at bar
no consideration for the privilege was shown; it even appeared
that the transportation to solicitors was furnished free. The
case might well have been .decided without any attempt to dis-
tinguish it from the earlier decision on the ground that no duty
exists on the part of the railroad to permit baggage solicitors
on its trains; that the situation is precisely analogous to the
nrews.-stand and fruit-stand problem, in which no duty, active or
passive, exists on the part of the carrier, and -in which case he
may withhold favors in the form of exclusive concessions, or
" There is an additional ground upon which the cases might possibly
have been distinguished. The liveryman was not a public servant but was
engaged in a private, business, and the case in this respect differs from
that of the stagecoach, telephone, and transfer company. As to the pres-
ence of consideration, a certain consideration, at least a profit to the inn-
keeper, was present in the Markham Case as it appears that the favored
drivers boarded and kept their teams at the inn, while the rivals did not.
'84 Mich. 194 (189o).
"Dingman v. Duluth, etc., Ry., 164 Mich. 328 "(19i1).
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bestow them where he will.-, The Michigan case distinguishes
this case from the earlier decisions by presuming from the
absence of compensation in the latter case that the arrangement
was solely for the benefit of the public. A monopoly bestowed
purely out of favor is as likely to be an arbitrary and pernicious
one, as is one founded upon consideration. The latter case is in
principle squarely opposed to the earlier one, and may be said
in substance, if not in terms, to overrule it.
The most recent state to reverse its attitude on this problem
is Pennsylvania. Quite recently the Superior Court of that
state departed from the rule laid down regarding express car-
riers in the early case of Sandford v. Railroad,0 and upheld a
contract by a railroad giving to a certain hackman the exclusive
privilege of coming upon its station grounds to solicit business; 77
and this in a case where it appeared that there was ample space
-for competing hackmen, where there was no congestion, and
where it appeared that if excluded from the railroad premises
rival hackmen could not approach nearer than twelve hundred
feet from the station.78 While the Sandford Casc was cited ii
behalf of the rival hackman, it does not appear whether the
precise analogy in theory between the two cases -was insisted
upon.
Neither in the opinion of the lower court nor of the Superior
Court on appeal is the Sandford Case adverted to. In both
opinions reliance appears to have been had chiefly upon Donovan
v. Pennsylvania Company 7 in which the Supreme Court of the
United States arrived at the same conclusion. But the latter
case had applied the federal rule of the Express Cases, a view
which the Pennsylvania courts had in the Sandford Case flatly
opposed. It had for some time been the opinion of many law-
yers in Pennsylvania that the rule of the Sandford Case no
longer represented the law. The Graham Case, by ignoring
"Wyman, Public Service Corporations, Sec. So.
"Supra, note z4.
"Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Graham, 64 Super. (Pa.) 437 (igi6).
SAppellant's Paper Book, p. 81 (No. 242; Oct. Term, xgj$).
"199 U. S. 279 (19o).
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it and laying down a rule opposed in theory, and by adopting the
doctrine of the federal courts, may be considered by implication
to have overruled it.
The situations in theory are identical. In both cases a pub-
lic duty, active or passive, is owed; and while the hack case
might have been distinguished on the ground that however
similar the two situations were in theory, practical considerations
present in the hack case were sufficiently persuasive to justify
monopolistic agreements which the express situation did not
justify, in the recent Pennsylvania case the arguments of con-
venience and avoidance of congestion, circumstances strongly
emphasized in the Donovan Case, were absent.80
It is beside the purpose of this article to enter upon a dis-
cussion of'the respective merits of the conflicting views upon this
problem.' This aspect of the question is an economic rather
than a legal one and occupies a position of great importance, in
the law of public service. From the foregoing sources, however,
it is submitted that these conclusions may be deduced: That
whatever duty is owed by public servants in the situations just
discussed is a duty owed to the public in general and not to
intermediate corcessionaries,, as such; and this is a conception
that was at first overlooked or repudiated, and has only recently
received judicial recognitiorn; that the" duty owed in this type of
cases, under either of the opposing views, comes within the pur-
view of the servant's duty to render service and is not incident
to its duty to refrain from unjust discrimination; and, lastly, that
the problem, in a great number of situations, is still unsettled,
the cases arriving at different conclusions in situations analogous
in theory, frequently by ignoring the analogy, by unsound dis-
tinctions on theory, and without frankly basing their decision
upon a differentiation warranted by consideration of practical
expediency.
Benjamin M.. Kline.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
"Phila. & Reading Ry. v. Godfrey, a8 Pa. C C. 326 (i9o3).
"Supra, note A6.
